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A Postplural Attitude1 
Reflections on subjectivity and ontology 
Christopher Gad 
IT-University of Copenhagen 
 
I wonder whether we may not envisage modernity rather as an attitude than 
as a period of history. And by ‘attitude’, I mean a mode of relating to 
contemporary reality; a voluntary choice made by certain people; in the end, 
a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one 
and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a 
task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called an ethos. And consequently, 
rather than seeking to distinguish the ‘modern era’ from the ‘premodern’ or 
‘postmodern’, I think it would be more useful to try to find out how the 
attitude of modernity, ever since its formation, has found itself struggling with 
attitudes of ‘countermodernity’ (Foucault 1992). 
Foucault made one of the strongest contributions to the now commonplace 
awareness in the social sciences and the humanities that ‘modern’, ‘postmodern’, 
‘premodern’ and ‘amodern’ can be considered attitudes, dispositions; particular 
stances of self in relation to reality, rather than specific historical eras. This is also 
the manner in which I aim, in this paper, to characterize a postplural attitude. My 
effort to do so, moves through concepts developed in post-actor-network theory 
(post-ANT) (Law & Hassard 1999; Mol 1999, 2002; Gad & Jensen 2010) and the 
social anthropology of M. Strathern. Strathern uses the notion of the ‘postplural’ 
(1991: xvi; 1992a: 3–4, 184, 192, 215 et passim) as a diagnostic term to elucidate 
the Euro-American present and, notably, how contemporary social anthropology 
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is conditioned by a certain realization of the limits of pluralism. She describes the 
current situation, as in some ways contravening modern pluralism, but also as 
simultaneously retaining a certain nostalgic and intimate relation to it. Postplural 
designates a certain reflexive mode of conceptualisation that emerges when 
pluralism becomes aware of its own mode of (re)producing knowledge. For the 
same reason the term does not entail that pluralism has been left entirely behind. 
Similarly, when I depict postpluralism as a specific ethos, I am not suggesting that 
postpluralism ‘goes beyond’ modern pluralism in an epochal and/or structural 
sense.2 This disposition contrasts with pluralism, yet, it is still dependent on it. It 
is this complicated relationship that I aim to capture with the conceptual 
constellation of the ‘postplural attitude’: I argue that the concept ‘postplural’ 
highlights a controversy with and a dependency on pluralism. Simultaneously, the 
concept ‘attitude’ indicates an awareness of being a specific and situated ethos. In 
this sense a postplural attitude both suggests an affinity for a certain mode of 
being and offers an intellectual challenge in the Foucauldian sense. 
Among other things, this challenge involves finding a way of rethinking 
relations between subjectivity and ontology. This interest structures the rest of the 
paper. First, I argue that one source of perspectivism and pluralism is the idea of 
certain constancy in the relation between subjectivity and ontology. Second, I 
exemplify a particular perspectivist and pluralist position in the form of a social 
constructivist argument. Third, I discuss important aspects of Strathern’s 
diagnosis of perspectivism and pluralism: this includes the creation of 
merographic connection, the effort to make the implicit explicit, and the 
consequent fragmentation of the very notion of perspective. Fourth, I describe a 
‘postplural ontology’ through science and technology studies (STS) scholar A. 
Mol’s idea of multiple and active ontologies. In Mol’s sense, ontologies cannot be 
understood as different ‘options’ for how to understand and describe reality. 
However, this does not imply that reality is fragmented. On the contrary, 
following Mol, reality is multiplied. Realities are seen as effects of practical 
compilations that consist of changing and partial connections between natural–
cultural elements. Thus, I use Mol’s work to expand constructively on Strathern’s 
diagnosis, which (if read narrowly and in isolation) can be interpreted as a 
negative reversal of pluralism. 3  Fifth, I illustrate a postplural conception of 
                                                          
2
’Ethos’ is Greek and means habitué /character. Ethos refers to the distinct the set of beliefs, 
ideas, etc. about social behavior and relationships of a person or group (Cambridge Dictionaries 
Online 2011). 
3
 In a recent exchange, Mol and Strathern discussed perspectivism (Strathern 2011a, 2011b, Mol 
2011). This discussion followed a somewhat different route than the one taken in this paper. 
Strathern contrasted the American-Indian perspectivism of E. Viveiros de Castro (1998) with 
perspectivism and suggested that Mol’s analysis remains bound up with a Euro-American 
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subjectivity through the photographic artworks of C. Sherman. Here, subjectivity 
emerges as performed. Sixth, in order to characterize the relation of the postplural 
attitude to the present, I contrast it with an ascription of a certain analytical 
‘heroism’ that can identified in modern and/or pluralistic approaches. I conclude 
by discussing a certain nostalgic, yet productive, relation between a postplural 
attitude and modern pluralism. 
Constants in Perspectivism and the Dream of Theoria 
In a pragmatic sense, relations between concepts of subjectivity and ontology4 are 
intertwined, because ideas about subjectivity afford, or perhaps even require, 
ideas about reality and vice versa. Simply stated, a modern attitude pictures 
something in this relation as constant. Something acts as the basis for a 
relationship between reality and self: for instance, the relation can be grounded 
psychologically, epistemologically or scientifically. In my view, the idea of the 
constant is one important characteristic of a modern outlook that can be identified 
already in the early modern philosophy of R. Descartes (1960). Here the existence 
of the cogito is depicted as indisputable. ‘The subject’ is what remains certain 
after the existence of everything has been questioned through sceptical and 
methodological doubt, while trust in the existence of reality is then established as 
‘a function’ of this exact premise, the existence of the cogito. 
The idea that a constant exists in the relation between subjectivity and 
ontology can be seen as an important historical source for the development of 
modern pluralism—via perspectivism. Perspectivism is basically the idea that 
different viewpoints afford certain visions of the world, or even that they 
constitute the realities they envision. In this sense any ‘perspective on reality’ 
exists ‘on a par’ with other perspectives. Accordingly, any particular world-view 
                                                                                                                                                               
‘cultural mathematics’ of perspectivism. Mol, in turn, attempted to critique and digress from this 
position ‘from within’ by focusing on how objects are multiple performed in practices. I do not 
suggest that either one is right. Rather, I suggest that Strathern’s diagnosis of the postplural 
might be constructively expanded and described as an attitude by adding Mol’s reformulation of 
ontology. Neither would I argue that a postplural attitude entirely transgresses modern pluralism. 
Instead, I think of them as different, co-existing dispositions.  
4
 The concept ontology designates “theories about what is, in so far as it is; Science of being. 
Ontology is a theory about the specific and necessary aspects of being” (Lübcke 1998: 323f, my 
translation). In my view, ontology concerns that which calls for explanation or explication where 
metaphysics, in contrast, might be described at ‘that which explains’. In other words, ontology is 
a conception of what unfolds and the ways it does so. Strictly speaking, of course, this also 
includes subjectivity. The subject can be instated as the grounding ontological concept; as for 
instance is the case in Descartes’ philosophy. In this text I use ontology in the meaning of 
‘ontology of reality’. That is in respect to what calls for explanation about reality – in relation to 
subjectivity. In addition I use the concepts of ‘ontology’ and ‘reality’ interchangeably in this paper.  
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is exactly one out of many, a plurality of possible views. This point is of cardinal 
importance for pluralism. Either perspectives act as constants in relation to a 
variable world, or the world is constant in relation to variable perspectives. In 
either case, different world-views are constructed that can then be compared to 
other word-views. Thus, perspectivism diversifies and pluralizes the world. As 
such, it is based on the idea of the existence of constants: distinguishable 
perspectives, or an objective reality. Thus, the idea that something basic or solid 
constitutes our ontologies and conceptualisations of the self does not oppose 
pluralism. Rather, this idea is one of its important sources. 
Postplurality challenges exactly this idea of constancy, inherent in 
perspectivism and pluralism. The idea of ‘perspectives’ as such is problematized 
and fragmented. Another characteristic of the postplural attitude is that it ceases to 
imagine a universal constant in the relation between subjectivity and ontology. 
As I see it, perspectivism is, as well, connected to the (utopian) hope that 
one view might become the basis for the formation of understanding in the sense 
of theoria; that is, as a universal, coherent and all-encompassing, explanatory and 
conceptual framework.5 This hope can be seen as one significant driving force for 
a continual development of new perspectives. Perspectivism undergirds a certain 
theory-hope (cf. Fish 2004) and precisely because every perspective has so far 
disappointed this hope, it continues to fuel the development of evermore 
perspectives. It is in part for this reason, according to Strathern, that the 
production of perspectives increasingly seems like an endless, or, indeed, futile 
endeavour, invariably leading to awareness that any one perspective might be just 
that: one out of a plurality of views, from which a potential infinity of, always, 
partial descriptions of reality emerges. This situation does not undermine 
perspectivism but infuses the common idea that there is always more to reality 
than meets the eye and that there are always more aspects to discover by looking 
at reality from new angles with a sense of uncertainty. 
Perspectivism exemplified: The relation between subjectivity and 
ontology in social constructivism 
Pluralism and perspectivism have influenced the social sciences and the 
humanities for many years and they continue to do so. One prominent and 
                                                          
5
 Theoria is the Greek work, from which the English term ’theory’ is derived. It is used in various 
ways, but it is often connected to religious speculative contemplation. Theoria is an intellectual 
striving to contemplate God and the world in its entirety (The Sage Colleges 2011). Here I use the 
term to designate a strong theory – a theory that is seen to be capable of explaining everything 
about the world. 
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influential example is social constructivism. It is thus useful to depict how 
subjectivity and ontology are imagined from a social constructivist standpoint, 
not least to gain insight into how Strathern and Mol’s work is different. With 
this elucidation in mind, I discuss how the relation between subjectivity and 
ontology is characterized in a classic social constructivist argument. The text is 
STS pioneer B. Barnes’ article ‘On the Conventional Character of Knowledge 
and Cognition’ (1983). Although social constructivism is often misread as 
‘dissolving all grounds’, even while pluralizing the world, showing how 
different culturally grounded perspectives construct the world in so many 
different ways, in the relation between subject and ontology, Barnes keeps 
something permanently constant. 
In Barnes (1983), one finds both a subjective/cognitive relativism, in the 
idea that subjects and cognition are shaped by something else, (in Barnes’ case: 
‘the social’), and an ontological relativism, the idea that reality exists only relative 
to something else. For Barnes, however, these relativisms do not quite entail that 
‘everything goes’. On the contrary, intersubjective relations produced by 
culturally specific ‘networks of learning’ quite clearly form a kind of ‘foundation’ 
for his social constructivism. Such networks of socially created relations always 
exist (in order for the world to make sense to human beings at all; in social 
constructivism it does not make sense to separate the existence of the world from 
how we get to know it). Now, of course, intersubjective relations develop 
differently depending on where and when human beings categorize and learn 
about reality and each other, from each other. At the same time, it is asserted that 
the human domain universally moulds ‘natural reality’; this is not an issue of 
human choice, but a consequence of the varied and relative ways in which human 
beings learn to categorize within specific cultures or social groups. 
Since social constructivism views all knowledge as socially constituted, 
several modern distinctions such as the one between “common knowledge” and 
scientific knowledge are demolished. In general, any evaluative distinction 
between ‘knowledge’ and ‘accepted convictions’ is rejected. Instead, 
understanding of subjects and their ontologies begins with two assumptions: “1) 
human beings move around in infinite and complex physical environments, which 
they attend to and therefore learn from; and 2) learning takes place in a social 
context, where human beings learn to classify, and put their classifications to use 
in varied practices” (21). 
Pointing out that conceptual constructions are grounded on similarities 
between empirical observations and not on individuation of natural objects, Barnes 
offers an empirical rejection of ontological essentialism. ‘Essences’ do not 
magnetically attract concepts and thus, there are no ‘natural kinds’ (28). Thus, 
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knowledge about reality is not based on correspondence but grounded in convention. 
It is common to hear the argument that terms are used in ‘the wrong way’, with 
reference to their ‘genuine’ or ‘real’ meaning. However, Barnes takes this to simply 
exemplify how these concepts have become part of a socially negotiated expanded 
use: “Such consensus merely marks the successful negotiation of an extension of 
usage” (32). E.g. ‘the real’ and ‘truth’ are rooted in the social domain. 
Different cultural and conceptual networks are therefore theoretically and 
analytically equivalent in terms of their relation to reality, although they might not 
be so politically or practically. All are equally conventional ‘projections’ of reality, 
representations that cannot be measured in terms of their distance or nearness to 
reality itself. Indeed, Barnes depicts ‘reality itself’ as a ‘passive mud of 
information’. Reality, qua mud, does not mind the conceptualizations, 
classifications, and organizations to which it is submitted: “Reality does not mind 
how we cluster it; ‘reality’ is simply the massively complex array of unverbalized 
information which we cluster” (33). 
This latter formulation is revealing about the social constructivist view of 
the relation between subjectivity and ontology. Subjects are related to their 
realities as constructors who are ‘other than’ and ‘after’ one natural, muddy and 
passive reality. Different cultures or socially constituted conceptual networks 
simply offer different perspectives to their subjects. 
In this specific sense, Barnes’ social constructivism exemplifies a form of 
perspectivism. Embedded in this conceptualisation is the idea, immanent to 
pluralism and perspectivism that ‘a view’ can operate as a constant in relation to 
reality (at least temporarily). Social constructivism furthermore shares with 
perspectivism the basically “egalitarian” idea that reality can be viewed from 
many different, discrete angles all of which may have their place in knowledge 
production. In place of the idea that descriptions of reality are ideally correct 
representations of ‘real’ reality is offered the suggestion that different perspectives, 
grounded, as they are, in different cultural conceptions and perceptions of reality, 
are of equal epistemic (and ontological worth).6 Reality, however, is seen as ‘one 
and the same’, in the passive sense that “it” neither resists nor contributes in any 
decisive way to our reality constructions. In principle, such constructions could be 
done in infinitely different ways. This leads to questions such as how we might 
compare them, how they are related, and what they accomplish. Since, neither 
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 Again, this does not mean that anything goes or that social constructivism equals moral 
voluntarism. (Smith 2002). Although social constructivism entails that the objects of reality in 
principle could have been categorized in an infinite number of different ways, it is also important 
to recognize that subjects cannot be convinced about anything whatsoever. (Barnes 1983: 39). 
Instead, the idea is that reality is constructed in relatively constant cultural networks. Subjects act 
within and because of these networks. 
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subjects nor reality are seen to be constitutive, this thesis exemplifies what can be 
called both a cognitive–subjective and an ontological relativism. Meanwhile, 
intersubjective, cultural and conceptual networks of learning are seen to be 
constant. In all cultures at all times, subjects cooperate to make up and use 
different, but equivalent, descriptions of one, admittedly complex, reality. In this 
sense, social constructivism is perspectivism, because any description of ‘reality’ 
flows from a single culturally located view among a plurality of others. 
It is in this sense that social constructivism is also a perspectivist meta-
perspective, one that enables us to see how different equivalent perspectives exist 
and produce a plurality of descriptions of reality.7 
Merographic connections 
Now as noted, according to Strathern, perspectivism is a very important 
characteristic of a modern pluralistic view, in the double sense that it both 
produces a specific understanding of relations and has an important role in 
constituting such relations. Perspectivism is thus intimately linked to what 
Strathern terms ‘merographic connections’ (1992a: 72–81, 1999: 246–60). This 
notion helps to explain how elements of reality are constituted and related as a 
consequence of how they are seen as parts of different ‘wholes’. Merographic 
connections, in Strathern’s diagnosis, are intrinsic to modern knowledge 
production. For example: because ‘the concept of the individual’ is seen as partly 
natural and partly societal, it can be assumed that ‘new sides’ of the individual can 
always be exposed by viewing the concept from each of these angles: 
Concepts form distinct, in the double sense of at once separate and crystal 
clear, orders of interpretation of experience. Nonetheless they coexist. The 
two perspectives can be connected, indeed comprise a pair. Thus one may 
think of commodified and non-commodified conceptions [...] Like market and 
non-market economies, joined together as oppositions or complementarities. 
At the same time, this joining does not yield a reciprocal or mutually defining 
relation. On the contrary, while the values can be aligned as positive and 
negative aspects of each other, each conception simultaneously draws on its 
own universe of connotations, applications and meanings. Each is 
connected to a unique, in the sense of self-referential, range of phenomena, 
which gives it its own character: The one differs from the other insofar as it is 
also part of a quite different context for action (Strathern 1999: 248). 
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 Such a metaperspective can also be identified in many other modern theories. It can be located 
in organisational theory, for instance, in G. Morgan’s Images of Organisation (1986) where 
different theories are seen as metaphors, which, if combined, offers a more ‘complete’, ’whole’ 
or ’comprehensive’ image of organisational reality, than any single perspective would be able to 
convey. 
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It [this mode of production of things and knowledge] presupposes that one 
thing differs from another insofar as it belongs to or is part of something else. 
I call this kind of connection, link or relationship merographic (Strathern 
1992a: 72f, emphasis in original). 
According to Strathern, merographic connections are established and become 
visible as a result of a basic ‘cultural mathematics’ put to use in comparative 
practices. For instance, concepts of technology and concepts of the human are 
related in the sense that we can simultaneously imagine that they are parts of the 
same ‘wholes’ and as parts of different domains. Thus, it is possible to imagine both 
that technologies and humans share the same world and that technologies are ‘dead 
objects’ while human beings are ‘living creatures’. These conceptualizations can 
thus also act as perspectives on each other as when we talk about the objectifying of 
humans or the anthropomorphising of technology. Thus merographic connections 
between technology and humans are constituted. 
For another illustration, consider merographic connections between 
humans and animals. It can be presumed that humans belong to a domain where, 
for instance, consciousness, thinking or a soul is present, while animals are 
imagined as creatures driven by instinct. In this way, humans and animals are 
imagined as different, yet comparable. Through this contrast humans and animals 
come to be seen as a ‘pair’ with the consequence that analogies can be drawn 
between their domains. One can thus talk about the human aspects of animals and 
vice versa. This is possible precisely because the domains at one and the same 
time overlap and draw on different sets of connotations. One characteristic of 
modern knowledge production is thus to bring ideas from different domains 
together (Strathern 1992b: 19). Indeed, whenever something ‘new’ is imagined 
to occur, it is always built from recombining ‘older’ analogies. 
In a sense, merographic connections are constituted by metaphorical moves 
(cf. Black 1962). It will always be possible to imagine that human beings belong to 
a cultural domain, which differs from the domains of technologies or animals, just 
as it will be possible to see humans as intimately related to technologies and 
animals. Yet, surprises occur, when apparently given distinctions become undone. 
For instance, from 1859 many have been provoked by Darwin’s theory of the origin 
of species (Darwin 1975) because it allows one to think that between human beings 
and animals there is no universal difference. The idea of ‘the human’ and the idea of 
‘the animal’ were pleonastisized in Darwin’s developmental perspective. In a 
similar way, D. Haraway’s ‘cyborg’ (1991a) is both evocative and provocative 
because of the way her writing evokes the borders between human/animal, 
human/technology and (not least) man/woman. Thus the cyborg figure breaks away 
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from using domains as constitutive ‘perspectives’ and instead envisions ‘man’ and 
‘technology’ (among others) as fundamentally hybrid domains. 
We notice, then, that thinking in terms of merographic connections means 
seeing domains as comparable, yet different, while not envisioning any phenomenon 
as reducible to the comparison. Drawing on ideas from one domain produces new 
knowledge about another, and relations between ideas are produced because cultural 
domains can simultaneously act as pairs and can be differentiated. A Western 
conception of the individual might draw its power through such syneidetic moves: 
e.g., a picture of an astronaut, who floats in (outer space) and a scan of an embryo in 
a womb (inner space) are very powerful in combination, because both domains can 
be seen to idiomatically frame ‘the same’; namely an individualised subject. 
Thus merographic connections proliferate with modern conceptions of 
reality, which view the world as ‘dualistic’ or ‘dichotomous’ according to an 
epistemic or ontic law of ‘tertium non datur’8. In social constructivism, we can 
also identify a similar distinction, namely that between ‘the social’ and ‘reality’, 
which makes it possible to make relations explicit between these domains. Such 
dichotomies can be viewed as categorization devices9 that are used to create order 
in a complex world (Bauman 1992: 183ff). A dichotomous ordering of reality is 
exactly what amodern thinkers such as Haraway diagnose and tries to denaturalize. 
As noted, her cyborg figure has the explicit purpose of destabilizing borders 
between human and technology, human and animal, male and female (1991a).10 
And, of course, the list of dualisms to be challenged could be expanded indefinitely: 
just consider dichotomies such as individual/society politics/science man/woman, 
nature/culture, us/them, knowledge/faith. 
Today, most social theorists seem to be trying to do away with the idea 
that such demarcations are given in nature. One interesting consequence of 
considering modern pluralism and perspectivism as productive of merographic 
relations, however, is to realize that this ‘transgression’ has always happened. 
When ‘the moderns’ kept domains separated, the domains thus separated could 
become perspectives for one another. Now, using the concept of merographic 
                                                          
8
 Tertium non datur means: ‘no third is given’, ‘there is no alternative’ or ‘take it or leave it’. 
Refers to ’the law of the excluded middle in logics (Everything2 2011). 
9
 Bowker and Star writes that “to classify is human” (1999: 1) with reference to the fact that 
classification (and thus a dichotomous view of the world) are not abstract constructions, invented 
by ‘unworldly’ philosophers. Classifications are necessary in order to navigate reality. However, 
many cases classifications have serious consequences for the actors involved, as for instance 
classifications as ‘black’ or ‘white’ under apartheid in South Africa. Their task is thus to 
understand how classifications work, how they are produced, in order to denaturalize them.  
10
 Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto” is also, among other things: “An argument for pleasure in the 
confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in the construction.”(1991a). Thus the task she 
depicts is not about removing modern categorizations, but of participating in negotiations 
concerning their ongoing (re)construction. 
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relations, we can see that this separation enables a continuous flow of relations 
between e.g. technology and human, etc.—or, in turn, that relations may 
separate. Dichotomies do not only reduce the world, they also pluralise and 
diversify it. In this sense, the cultural reproduction of viewing the world as 
plural and diverse is immanent to perspectivism and, thus, to practices of 
metaphor and analogy, to dichotomous categorization, and to perceiving the 
world in terms of distinct domains. 
Consequently, the perspectivist reproduction of world views and 
understandings of the self is rooted, simultaneously, in the idea that the world is 
divided into different interacting but separate domains, and in the idea that they 
can be used as ‘perspectives’ to shed light on ourselves and reality. As a result 
domains are assumed to be incompatible: while domains certainly do overlap, 
each domain draws on its own set of connotations. At the same time they are also 
thought to be incomplete: there is always ‘more’ to learn than what any one 
perspective can highlight. This is why one would have to articulate all 
perspectives in order to describe ‘Reality’ as a whole. And here we are back at the 
impetus for constantly developing ‘new’ perspectives related to the theory-hope 
described above. We will always be able to discover more by developing new 
perspectives. There is ‘progress’ in knowledge production in so far as the ‘more’ 
perspectives we use, the ‘more’ knowledge we seem to produce. 
The development of perspectives, by drawing analogies and developing 
merographic connections, thus forms a basis for the constitution of subjects 
and elements of reality. This is a core aspect of the idea of reality as plural. 
Pluralism is in this sense an effect of perspectivism. When recognizing that any 
one specific perspective forms a partial view of reality, there will always be 
more to discover about reality, (and ourselves) than what is visible from any 
given angle. Plurality is thus not just one way of imagining, what is reality 
here and now, it is also projected into the future, which is imagined to be more 
complex, rather than less. 
Problematizing perspectivism 
According to Strathern, Euro-Americans have thus for a long time reproduced 
ideas about themselves and their relations by drawing analogies between different 
cultural domains. To use an aphorism, this is ‘culture in action’.11  Academic 
practices, for example in social anthropology and STS, can be seen as basically 
pertaining to this quite mundane strategy. 
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 Referencing B. Latour’s Science in action (1987) 
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A modern attitude characterized by perspectivism continuously 
(re)constructs reality as plural. As noted, it follows that reality turns into an 
inexhaustible container of ‘new’ phenomena and perspectives to be discovered 
and explored. Yet, if the inertia in the continuous production of perspectives is 
based on the hope of developing theoria, then the production of perspectives and 
pluralism also seem to contain an immanent, self-produced absurdity: 
In the late twentieth century, anthropology has already moved from a plural 
to what could be called a postplural perception of the world […] the 
realization of the multiplier effect produced by innumerable perspectives 
extends to the substitutive effect of apprehending that no one perspective 
offers the totalizing vista it presupposes. It ceases to be perspectival 
(Strathern 1991: xvi). 
Perspectivism, through the development of more and more perspectives, quite 
simply, produces the dissolution of the idea of perspective as perspective. This 
realization signifies the postplural moment. Yet, it is hard to envision 
alternatives. Strathern’s diagnosis points to an important problem of the present 
moment: If perspectives cease to be perspectival, there is risk of a certain 
cultural/cognitive loss: cultural elements might simply disappear. For instance, 
if a ‘societal perspective’ and a ‘nature perspective’ have made visible and/or 
constituted the ‘individual’ or ‘the person’, what happens then if these 
perspectives dissolve? Will the individual also disappear? (Strathern 1992a: 
144–50). A kind of cultural amnesia might be one rather radical consequence of 
the fragmentation of perspectivism. The entailment would be that the possibility 
for different cultural domains to act as perspectives for one another dissolve 
along with the merographic connections produced. How then to imagine reality 
as diverse and how things are interrelated? 
This realization might, indeed, sap motivation to continue the 
development of perspectives, which can produce understandings of the relation 
between subject and world as basically absurd. An example from 
contemporary Norwegian literature makes the point. In E. Loe’s popular novel, 
Naïve. Super, a friend of the main character suggests that he should travel the 
world to gain a ‘new perspective’. To this suggestion the main character 
replies that “perspective is something you ought to get as a pill and inject 
intravenously” (1996, my translation). The possibility of discovering 
something ‘new’ by gaining yet another ‘perspective’ is seen as futile. The 
example elucidates how an effort to get a new perspective, or develop already 
existing ones, quite easily can come to appear to be meaningless in the 
contemporary moment. 
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Processes of making explicit 
We can apprehend the ‘self-undermining’ effect of perspectivism and pluralism as 
a ‘reflexive’ or ‘unintended’ consequence of a modern drive to make everything 
explicit, to articulate phenomena through multiple perspectives, either in the hope 
that this might to lead to theoria, or merely as a habitual mode of knowledge 
production that is able to reproduce itself indefinitely. 
Making the implicit explicit I refer to as an act of literalisation, that is, a mode 
of laying out the coordinates or conventional point of reference of what is 
otherwise taken for granted (Strathern 1992a: 5). 
In the Western world, at some point it became taken for granted that there will 
always be ‘more’ to reality than what is presently visible from any one 
perspective. This idea is connected to another idea that has become common 
sense; namely that reality and the self both contain ‘depths’ and ‘secrets’ 
(Strathern 2002). At least since the romantic era, the idea of a ‘layered self’ has 
been a dominant way of imagining the subject in the West (Taylor 1989: 368ff). 
In an early modern novel, for instance, the self was depicted as an ‘onion’ with 
many layers to be peeled off. 12  Following this conception, there is always a 
‘ground’ or ‘dimension’ behind what is seen. Another motor for knowledge 
production is therefore expressionistic; a curiosity to discover and articulate what 
lies behind or under what can be readily seen. 
Making explicit can be understood as bringing to the surface what is taken 
for granted, and the analogy between this mode of enquiry and perspectivism is 
clear. Westerners can be apprehended as having always taken a lot for granted, 
which has fuelled need to make the hidden explicit. Perspectivist and pluralist 
knowledge production can, thus, also be seen as the continual explication of 
implicit assumptions In this sense, too, modern perspectivism is related to an idea 
of progress: As time goes by, and ‘more and more’ perspectives are developed, 
thus more and more will be revealed, and more insights will be accumulated. 
As described above, to learn something new by analogical or metaphorical 
operations has become a prerequisite for understanding cultural domains. When 
what is taken for granted is brought to the surface, this new knowledge may, in 
turn, become, yet another perspective that can be used in the hunt for yet more 
                                                          
12
 The illustration of the human being or the self as an ’onion’, which through ‘peeling’ reveals new 
aspects comes from the Norwegian writer H. Ibsen’s Peer Gynt from 1867 (1975). The main 
character, Peer, peels an onion while articulating the hope of discovering his inner, true self, but 
when he removes the last layer he finds nothing. That this might be the endpoint of continuous 
digging is sometimes ignored in romantic conceptions of human beings as containing ’depths’ 
and ’layers’. The task of ‘peeling’ can go on forever. The postplural attitude could be apprehended 
as the point where we no longer think that anything specific (whether nothingness or essence) is 
revealed. Rather this mode of revealing is exactly what becomes explicit. 
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undiscovered relations ad infinitum. Strathern points out, however, that processes 
of making explicit are never neutral in relation to the knowledge produced or vice 
versa. Instead, established knowledge is displaced when ‘new’ knowledge is 
created. What was made explicit loses its taken for granted status and the ‘context 
of discovery’ (or put more adequately: the situated knowledge, perception and 
understanding at play) thereby also changes its meaning: 
The displacement effect of uncovering assumptions, of making the implicit 
explicit, sets off an irreversible process. The implicit can never be recovered, 
and there is no return to old assumptions; displacement becomes radical 
(Strathern 1995). 
Both ‘what we understand’ and ‘what we understood’ changes, when specific ideas 
are made explicit (after which such ideas might be viewed as relative to culture or 
as no more than certain possibilities among others). There is no return, no way to 
re-embed ‘old’ assumptions. In this sense, knowledge production loses its aura of 
progression. We no longer seem to produce more and more because there is also a 
dimension of loss or forgetting related to any kind of knowledge production. 
Strathern points out that the current state of affairs is exactly characterized 
by the becoming explicit of this mode of making explicit. The result is a 
problematization of perspectivism and pluralism: 
One effect of literalisation is to realise that describing a process as 
construction is itself a construction of sorts. This is the autoproof of social 
constructionism (Strathern 1992a: 5). 
Social constructivism is ‘auto-proofed’ when analytical texts are also viewed as 
constructions. When it becomes explicit that our own texts are also constructions, 
it seems that what they bring to the surface is just another surface, which in turn, 
can lead to yet other surfaces, ad infinitum. But if no ground is ever really 
revealed, the purpose of making explicit becomes unclear. The auto-proof of 
social constructivism is thus ambiguous from a post-plural conceptualisation. It is 
unclear, from where we see, why we construct, and what the material used for 
construction really is.13 
When perspectivism, pluralism, and the strategy of explication itself are 
made explicit, however, according to Strathern, it contributes to ‘a sense of being 
post’, a sense that characterizes current times: 
Making the implicit explicit is a mode of constructing knowledge which has been 
the engine of change for more than a hundred years. It has also produced an 
internal sense of complexity and diversity. But to make explicit, this mode has its 
own effect: the outliteralization of the literal-minded. I suspect something similar 
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 This kind of confusion has lead to critical discussions of social constructivism such as Hacking 
(1999).  
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to this particular literalisating move has been behind the prevalent sense of a 
now that is after an event. This sense of being after an event, of being post-, 
defines the present epoch (1992a: 7, emphasis in original). 
Making explicit irreversibly changes both ‘new’ and ‘old’ ideas. This leads to a 
situation of infinite regress and hence a sense of being ‘post-’. 
A postplural perception—partial connections 
A postplural understanding emerges when the strategy of making things explicit 
in is itself made explicit; when the penetration of ‘surfaces’ is seen to reveal only 
other ‘surfaces’. When the perspective is fragmented, elements of reality can no 
longer be viewed as parts of domain–wholes, but only as so many ‘parts’, which 
can be connected to so many other ‘parts’. 
The development of ‘new’ insights, descriptions of self and reality, cannot be 
understood as the effect of finding new angles on reality or as the disclosure of depths. 
Instead, the term ‘new’ comes to refer to reconfigurations of already existing cultural 
elements. When perspectives ‘merely’ seem to bring ‘surfaces’ to ‘surface’ and no 
alternative can be imagined, a sense of absurdity in finding new perspectives emerges 
(as in the example of taking perspectives as pills), as does a certain nostalgia for a 
moment when knowledge was considered (or at least imagined to be) less 
problematic. But this does not mean that the development of new understandings of 
subjectivity or reality comes to a halt. While cultural practices still consist of creating 
and describing relations between ideas (Strathern 1992a: 19), we now have to 
imagine this as pastiche or collage (165), bricolage (Butler, see Klages 1997), or 
assemblage (Deleuze, see Rose 1998: 169ff). 
Even though the development of new descriptions of the self and reality 
does not stop when the perception of inertia in the development of new perspectives 
is undermined, differences and similarities cannot, in a post-plural conception, be 
reduced to what different perspectives have or do not have ‘in common’. Further, 
post-plurality means that the hope of constructing a finite perspective is gone. 
Rather, ambition shifts to ‘repeating’, ‘calibrating’ or ‘performing’ already 
outspoken and visible differences and similarities and inventing ‘new’ relations 
between cultural elements. Thus relations are always partial: 
The relativising effect of multiple perspectives will make everything seem 
partial; the recurrence of similar bits and propositions will make everything 
seem connected (Strathern 1991: xx). 
The explication of any particular perspective as just one among a plurality of 
perspectives sets in motion a cultural process of substitution, where the idea of 
perspective as such is fragmented, and perspectivism and pluralism are problematized. 
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Attempts to go beyond perspectivism and pluralism, however, risk loss of the ability 
to articulate important aspects of the cultural. Another risk is undermining a plural 
idea of a diverse world and respect for other valuable perspectives. 
Yet, explications are irreversible: there is no return to the belief that the 
development of new perspectives will forever continue to fuel knowledge 
production and progression, or that we will ever learn more about reality. In a 
perspectivist and pluralist conception of reality there is always more to the case, 
always a part of the world or the subject, which is yet to be highlighted, and 
something will always remain hidden, waiting to be made visible. A modern 
pluralist attitude immanently produces the energy to perform the continual work 
of making things explicit. In the long, however, this basic relation to reality in 
modern Euro-American knowledge production runs out of steam. The modern 
attitude becomes explicit and can no longer be taken for granted, but neither is it 
possible to leave it entirely behind. It is in this sense that a certain nostalgia 
characterizes the post-plural attitude and Strathern’s diagnosis. 
Yet, in my view, the task is not to resolve these cultural problems, even if 
they are serious ones. People seemingly continue to succeed in holding 
‘differences’ and ‘similarities’ in their life worlds together, in spite of fragmented 
and partial visions. One task is, indeed, to rethink how this is possible. 
Multiplicities—a conception of ontology for a postplural attitude 
Postplural nostalgia proffers the challenge of rethinking relations between 
subjectivity and ontology. This challenge is addressed in post-ANT (Gad & 
Jensen 2010). The Dutch philosopher Mol has made one of the most convincing 
arguments in this regard. In the following I will describe her post-ANT-ontology 
as a constructive expansion of Strathern’s postplural diagnosis. 
Mol addresses how post-ANT has contributed to a re-formulation of 
dominant conceptions of ontology (1999). (Post-)ANT has described how reality 
is performed in multiple practices. Mol draws the conclusion that reality itself is 
multiple. While it is commonly accepted that reality is always changing, many 
still think about reality in terms of mastering and controlling a rather passive 
reality; passive, for instance, in the sense that it is controlled by various natural 
forces, or passive in the social constructivist sense that reality does not mind how 
we categorize it. The basic building blocks of reality are thus often assumed to be 
constant, facilitating our endeavours to observe and map it. In contrast, Mol 
suggests that we are dealing with active, resistant realities.14 
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 Re-presentation is political strategic presentation; that is, re-presentation always means 
intervention (Haraway 1994). But reality also intervenes. 
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According to Mol, post-ANT strips reality of its stable and universal 
character and does this in its ontological dimension. She suggests that ontologies 
are situated, historically, culturally and materially—and not just theoretically 
speaking, but also in relation to things—realities are ‘done’, ‘practiced’, ‘enacted’ 
or ‘performed’ by many heterogeneous actors. This enables her to talk about 
ontologies because if reality is ‘ enacted’ and ‘ performed’ in differently 
situated practises and by different constellations of hybrid actors, then it is—
literally—multiple. 15  While some might find this conception similar to 
perspectivism, implicating that different realities emerge in relation to 
subjectivities, Mol rather suggests that ontological politics are expressed in 
different practices; the ontological does not precede the political or the cultural 
and active, actors (which can be both human and non-human) impact ‘culture’. 
‘The real’ is implicated in politics and vice versa (Mol 1999). 
Thus, multiple does not mean the same as plural, even if the concept, like 
perspectivism, entails a critique of the idea of ‘one objective reality’. In 
perspectivism, observers view reality using culturally constituted, differently 
informed perspectives. One result of this plurality of views, even if a single 
objective reality existed, would be to render that reality objectively unknowable. 
While perspectivism breaks away from an objectivist, scientific, monopolising 
regime of truth, perspectivism does not multiply reality, which is still viewed as 
one reality. Perspectivism only multiplies ‘the eyes of the beholders’. In 
perspectivism ‘the Cartesian gaze’ becomes seen as one perspective among many 
other points of view. 
And this in turn brought pluralism in its wake. For there they are: mutually 
exclusive perspectives, discrete existing side by side, in a transparent space. 
While in the center the object of the many gazes and glances remains 
singular, intangible, untouched (76, org. emphasis). 
According to Mol, some social constructivist accounts, with points of departure in 
this objectivism, create a pluralism that enables them to address how different 
people make different interpretations because they are part of different cultures. 
Other constructivist studies, to demonstrate the existence of historical alternatives to 
the artefacts we take for granted today, emphasize materiality.16 Thus, it is shown 
that seeds for alternative constructions of reality were present, but not allowed to 
flourish. In such cases plurality and contingency are projected into the past. 
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 The concept of performance is not to be understood in the sense that there is something real 
behind what is being performed. In her later work, Mol prefers the concept ’enactment’ (2002: 
chap. 2). However the concept of performativity also connotes that there is creativity in unfolding 
ontologies in practice. This is why I like to keep it with the just mentioned reservation in mind.  
16
 For instance, Bijker & Pinch (1989) describe how several historical alternatives existed to the 
bicycle that we see as natural today. 
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According to Mol, an understanding of reality as multiple requires of us 
other metaphors than perspective and construction, for example, intervention and 
performance. Reality is done or enacted rather than observed (Mol 1999: 77). 
Reality is manipulated in many different ways, in distinct practices, and does not 
lie around waiting untouched under a diversity of gazing eyes. Reality does not 
only appear in the light of perspectives, it emerges in situated practical work in 
which different versions of objects and subjects enact each other. Different, yet 
related, versions of objects and subject exist, taking part in the performance of 
different versions of reality. 
If multiple realities are performed, in other words, different realities are 
practiced simultaneously, it then becomes easy to conceive that one can choose 
between these different performed worlds. However, asking where one would 
situate oneself in order to be able to make such a choice, Mol asserts that no such 
location exists. Rather, she points out, normative moments are often linked to 
noticing the absence of such a place: possibilities seem to be everywhere, but 
always somewhere else than here. For instance, normative decisions often make 
reference to ‘facts’, coming from elsewhere. In my view, the idea that a place 
exists from where it is possible to get an overview and choose between world-
views, is rooted in the implicit metaperspective constructed by social 
constructivism and perspectivism, mentioned above. According to Mol, however, 
ontological analysis is not about making possibilities of choice more explicit. 
Rather, the intellectual task is to investigate what it means to live in situation of 
“choice incorporated” (Mol 1999: 86). 
In Mol’s ‘ontological approach’, unlike the perspectivist apprehension of a 
plurality of epistemically equivalent and limited perspectives, different versions of 
reality are performed together; different performances do not exclude each 
other—indeed, they are often entangled: “What is ‘other’ is also within” (Mol 
1999: 85). Realities are complex networks of many different objects, ideas, 
subjects etc. and no description of them is ever final. As in perspectivism, there is 
always more to account for, but no privileged meta-perspective from where one 
can criticise, judge, or choose between specific performances. Consequently, the 
multiplication of reality does not mean that different ‘aspects’ of reality can be 
revealed. Rather it calls for investigation of how different versions of reality are 
practiced and how they interrelate. 
These conditions also apply to the relation between subject and 
ontology. Subjects do not stand as external, constant observers of reality. They 
are situated and practice their partial views in relation to multiple realities. 
Mol’s idea of multiple ontologies, thus, in a sense, takes into account 
Strathern’s diagnosis and the fragmentation of perspective to which it leads. 
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Our outlooks, in a certain sense, have always been fragmented and situated: no 
more and no less. Yet, this does not mean that reality falls apart. The 
multiplicity of objects means instead that they are not singular and separated. 
Objects exist as different, yet related, ‘versions’. They are “more than one, but 
less than many” (2002: 82). The social constructivist idea that reality is one 
‘passive mud’ is rejected, because it is noticed that reality consists 
multiplicities of actors and networks, including the ones we refer to as subjects, 
who participate in onto-political activity and dynamic resistance during world-
building activities. 
Since a postplural attitude is connected to the idea of reality as multiple 
and active, in the form of situated and changing configurations of theory and 
practice, ontological descriptions and constructions of subjectivity are revitalized. 
Nothing in the relation between subject and ontology is seen as constant. Instead 
this attitude acknowledges that both objects and subjects are hybrid participants in 
the performance of varied realities. Cognitive, subjective and ontological 
essentialism, as along with relativism, are thus rejected. Instead, a relativist 
relationism appears, in which subjects and other natural–cultural elements are 
seen as co-constitutive actors–networks. 
The adoption of Mol’s ‘post-ANT-ontology’ is consequential if one 
subscribes to a postplural attitude. It both facilitates a rebellion against the 
modern idea of a constant reality, and against the idea that reality is a passive, 
yet complex, ‘mud’.17 Consequently, it also calls for a rejection of ideas of the 
subject as either constant or passive. A version of such resistance is offered in 
the photographic works of Sherman which, below I suggest can be used to 
exemplify a postplural attitude. Analogically to Mol’s post-ANT-ontology, 
Sherman articulates an understanding of subjectivity as performed. The subject 
is not pluralized but multiplied. 
Subjectivity performed 
The works of Sherman rebels against modern conceptions of subjectivity as part 
of a Cartesian and ‘free-standing’ view of reality. From the point of view of the 
history of photography, the idea of a ‘constant’ subjectivity is assumed in 
naturalism and in the modern portrait: here real subjects are presented. Sherman’s 
works, in contrast, declares that subjectivity is performed. Simultaneously it 
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 In post-ANT and similar perceptions, reality is not passive, but rather ‘that which resists’ 
(Latour in Bowker and Star 1999: 49). Pickering (1995) also offers the convincing argument 
that ’the real’ emerges in an interplay between resistance and accommodation including human 
beings, natural phenomena, technologies, etc. 
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provokes the sense that the point of view observing the photographs is fragmented. 
To clarify this point I first offer a contrast to the photographs of Sherman:18 
 
                                                          
18
 I found this clipping in the diary of my grandfather Ulf Gad, which was written during the 
Second World War. It probably appeared in one of the major Danish newspapers on October 9, 
1950, and it was added to his diary after the war ended to commemorate the role of the British.  
 C. Gad. A Postplural Attitude 
69 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
W. Churchill is on his way to the War Office, first, during The First World War 
and then, after an interval of 25 years, The Second World War. ‘Winnie is back’, 
the caption pronounces. The photographs depict Churchill appearing in an eerily 
similar way. Nothing, except hat fashion, seems to have changed over time. The 
pictures show two particular ‘heroic’ moments: Churchill on his way to save the 
day. To return to Foucault’s text, the rubric for this essay, where he describes the 
characteristics of a modern attitude (1992), the pictures also try to capture 
something heroic and lasting about the present moment, nothing before or after, 
but something that is unique about exactly this moment. I will return to this 
characterisation below. 
To interpret the picture psychologically, the photographs work because the 
observer sees a patriarchal figure: an authentic, goal-oriented, esteemed, and 
powerful subject. Churchill looks downwards and inwards, as a rational being 
with an important task at hand. We are presented with a masculine ideal, the 
universal man (Haraway 1997: 241–4), to the contextualized observer, 
nationalism and other resonant narrative. Meanwhile, the pictures also invite us to 
think of the inner depths of human beings, as presented, for example, in 1899 by J. 
Conrad in The Heart of Darkness (1998).19 Churchill was particularly known for 
his conscious self-presentation, a point, which, of course, could be used to modify 
this interpretation. In combination, however, the photos nevertheless provide a 
strong metaphorical material for the idea of the autonomous, constant, modern 
Cartesian subject and romantic ideas about inner ‘depths’ and ‘layers’. Let us 
then contrast this presentation with Sherman’s photography. 
According to the artist herself, she aims to put subjectivity at stake: to be 
“in the picture’ [...] is to feel dispersed, subject to a picture organized not by form 
but by formlessness” (in Smith unpublished). The subjects in the pictures are 
fragmented, and as a consequence, the ‘perspective’ of the observer also becomes 
fragmented: “It is the very fragmentation of that ‘point’ of view that prevents this 
invisible, unlocateable gaze from being the site of coherence, meaning, unity, 
gestalt, eidos” (Smith unpublished). Indeed, Sherman’s hope is that through the 
experience of her photographs, notions of subjectivity will become unmoored 
from a singular point from where it is assumed that the world can be viewed. 
                                                          
19 
Conrad’s The Heart of Darkness is a story about a journey to the almost impenetrable ‘center’ 
of Africa. And the novel provides one of the most powerful metaphors for humans travelling the 
depths of the soul. The novel posits a strong critique of the idea of the subject containing a ’core’, 
or a constant, stable aspect. At the end of the journey (to the depth of the soul), no core or truth 
is found. Instead, one is confronted with a version of ’the nothing’, which Ibsen’s Peer Gynt 
discovers when he peels of the layers of the onion of subjectivity (cf. note 12). In Conrad this is 
pure madness. F. F. Coppola’s epic Vietnam movie Apocalypse Now (1979) is moulded over The 
Heart of Darkness. 
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Most of her photographs are differently orchestrated ‘self-portraits’. Sherman 
‘performs’ dressed as different figures: a Hollywood star, a man, a woman, an 
animal. Individually, the photographs may not tell us much but, in combination, 
they provide us with a view of subjectivity quite different from the paired 
photographs of Churchill. Both sets have one thing in common, though: to achieve 
their effect, they rely on combinations of images. The paired Churchill pictures 
promote the idea of constant subjectivity. By contrast, Sherman’s pictures exhibit 
how this epistemological trick works, as her pictures in combination problematize 
assumptions that precede and guide the act of viewing: such as individuality, 
identity, essentialism, the dichotomies of man/woman, staged/authentic etc. 
Conceptions of what is natural and normal about subjects are disturbed. A 
discussion about subjectivity beyond the pictures takes place between the pictures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Samples of Sherman’s pictures. It is in their interplay 
that a view of subjectivity as performed emerges. 
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Subjectivity is explicitly performed and staged in these photographs. These 
performances suggest, however, that staging is always involved, also outside the 
world of the photos. Aside from disrupting taken-for-granted conceptions of the 
normal subject, Sherman, especially in her later works, also attacks the idea of 
subjectivity as detached from the world. She calls into question the ability of the 
subject to delimit itself from reality by objectifying it. By questioning the notion 
of a stable border between subjectivity and world, the idea of an autonomous, 
freestanding, self-relying subject is presented as a kind of dystopia, out of sync 
with reality. Instead, we are offered through Sherman’s combination of pictures, a 
vision in which subjects are shaped through relations with other kinds of actors In 
this sense, too, we may suggest that Sherman’s photographs are in line with J. 
Butler’s diagnosis of the utopian nature of the distinction between a pure subject 
and a ‘messy’ reality: 
For inner and outer worlds to remain utterly distinct, the entire surface of the 
body would have to achieve an impossible impermeability. This sealing of its 
surfaces would constitute the seamless boundary of the subject; but this 
enclosure would invariably be exploded by precisely that excremental filth 
that it fears (Butler 1999: 170). 
Sherman’s photographs as a statement resonate with Butler’s and exemplify a 
postplural conception because they suggest that it is only possible to think of the 
subject as distinct from reality by closing the shutters between the subject and 
something else, such as the impure, animalistic, unknown, strange, or other. It is 
only by means of such artificial boundaries that the subject can be viewed as 
special and privileged being, like a Cartesian subject, which, indeed, acquires self-
worthiness by submitting both its own body and reality at large to the will and 
control of the subject (Taylor 1989: 148ff). 
For both Sherman and Butler, however, this demarcation seems both 
utopian and political: how the border between self and reality is constituted is of 
serious consequence for what is excluded and included. For instance, it will often 
matter greatly whether something is considered to be human or nonhuman. 
Sherman’s photographs express the hope that the Cartesian view of the self will 
be problematized in meeting ‘the other’. Subjectivity might then be understood to 
contain a kind of strangeness itself; it becomes possible to realize that: “what is 
‘other’ is also within” (Mol 1999: 75). 
In this conception, there is thus no constant subjectivity or reality, no 
authenticity or moment of origination behind what is performed. Accordingly, 
the romantic idea of the human as a creature of layers and depths is also 
problematized. What might seem universal is shown in Sherman’s photographs 
to be instead anchored in situated performances. Subjectivity thus emerges as 
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so many different, yet possibly related, performances: as a non-definite 
number of ‘done’, ‘enacted’ versions of subjectivity. Subjectivity is as multiple 
as Mol’s reality. This is why it becomes possible to displace the traditional, 
utopian and individualistic understanding of subjectivity. This form of 
subjectivity, however, is not viewed as ‘an illusion’, which can be wiped away 
by a pure theoretical or intellectual operation because, among other reasons, it 
is itself enacted in various ways. 
Further characterisation of a postplural attitude 
I have contrasted a postplural attitude to modern, social constructivist, 
perspectivist, and pluralist ideas. Making this very contrast also illustrates, 
however, how a post-plural attitude actually depends on such ideas. Postpluralism 
thinks against certain conceptualizations related to a modern attitude, and it does 
so in some particular ways. 
This interdependence, in my view, is related to the infeasibility of moving 
entirely beyond important modern conceptualizations. At the very least, it is very 
hard to imagine that they will stop impacting how we think. Thus, adopting a 
postplural attitude is not a call for radical transgression, nor is the aim to dissolve 
a modern attitude. Rather, it is a call for experimentation involving the 
displacement of modern demarcations, a matter of rethinking dominant 
conceptualizations. This might be what diagnosis of our concepts of subjectivity 
and ontology was always about: 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a 
theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is 
accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical 
life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the 
historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment 
with the possibility of going beyond them (Foucault 1992). 
Even though it is possible to think of ‘the perspective’ as partial and fragmented, and 
of reality and subjectivity as multiple, this postplural conception, first and foremost, is 
enabled by the existing modern attitude. Likewise, the understanding of reality as 
plural is partially constituted in interplay with modern pluralism and modern 
objectivism. In this sense, any postplural attitude needs a modern attitude and differs 
from ‘postmodern theories’, those proclaiming, for example, ‘the death of the subject’ 
or ‘the end of history’ or making similar types of epochal pronouncements. 
Even so, this dependence does not necessarily mean that a postplural attitude 
is faithful to its origins, just like the cyborg postplural thinking is able to diverge from 
its problematic heritage (Haraway 1991a). Rethinking and diagnosis are not only a 
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‘reflexive’ project, which displaces the same to elsewhere, but also a project of 
diffraction: A non-innocent, complex, and ‘erotic’ practice of producing a difference, 
however small and partial it might be (Haraway 1994).20 Because Sherman seeks to 
displace the boundaries of the subject by confronting it with something other, her 
works can be apprehended as examples of diffractive experimentation. 
I have highlighted several characteristics of a modern attitude. They 
include pluralism and perspectivism, the assumption of a certain constancy in 
the relation between subject and ontology, and application of the modern law 
of tertium non datur, which continues to produce dichotomies such as 
subject/reality, human/technology, and nature/culture. This is, of course, not a 
complete description of ‘the modern’. Foucault (1992) finds a modern attitude 
at play in the works of the French writer Baudelaire, whom he sees as having a 
special heroical way of relating to the present: perhaps similar to the aura of 
the photographs of Churchill. To adopt a modern attitude is, according to 
Foucault, thus also characterized by ascribing a specific heroism to the present. 
Heroic, in the sense that the task is always to catch something eternal in this 
very moment. A modern attitude for Foucault is then, too, a particular way of 
situating oneself historically. 
I do not argue that a postplural attitude ‘goes beyond’ seeing itself as a 
historically specific way of relating to the present, although it does do so in certain 
respects. A postplural attitude does not see the present moment as heroical. Rather it 
finds it ambiguous, ambivalent, and hence somewhat ironical. The difference can be 
clarified with assistance from Foucault, Kant, R. M. Rilke, and Loe. As well as 
Baudelaire, Foucault (1992) also sees another source of the modern attitude in 
German philosopher Kant’s text What is Enlightenment? (1993). Kant wrote the 
text in 1783, and Foucault holds it be a very special text because it offers an original 
explication of its own historical moment. Kant, Foucault suggested, tried to 
articulate what difference today introduces with respect to yesterday (Foucault 
1992). Kant’s understanding of the present was defined by the idea of 
enlightenment as an ‘event’, which he believed could unfold at some point in the 
future, given the right circumstances. According to Foucault, this projection of the 
future was, almost exclusively, negatively defined because enlightenment is seen as 
an exit from a “self-indulged state of disability” (1993: 71, my translation). This 
negative view of the present moment in relation to a potential future event infuses 
the present moment with a need for heroism. 
                                                          
20 
So, too, with this paper. Of course, I would not claim that this text holds any power to change 
much. In my view, academic work and the theoretical practice it entails might, however, produce 
small particular differences, without guarantee. 
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In The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (1910), German poet Rilke 
likewise relates to the present through a vision of the future: 
For the sake of one verse one would have to visit many places, people, and 
things, one would have to become familiar with the animals, one would have 
to feel how the birds fly, and get to know the small movements of flowers, 
when they open in the morning. One should be able to think of roads in 
foreign places, of unexpected encounters, and of goodbyes that were 
anticipated for a while, […] One needs memories of nights making love, of 
which none were alike; of the screams of women in labour and of light, white 
women around the time of delivery, who close themselves. Yet, one must 
also have been close to the dying; one should have sat by the dead in the 
room with the open window and the pulsing sounds. And it is even not 
enough to have these memories. One should also be able to forget them, if 
they are plenty, and patience is needed for them to reoccur, because they 
are not yet themselves memories. Not until they become the blood of our 
bodies, our gaze and movement, namelessly, and can no longer be 
separated from us, not until this moment it might happen, on a very rare 
occasion, that the first word of verse, emerges from their centre and ascend 
from them (1986: 16–17, my translation, original emphasis removed). 
The idea of ‘the here and now’ constituted with reference to a projected future 
event, where practically everything that life has to offer might crystallize in a 
single verse, is illustrated in this quote. Rilke idealizes a moment of catharsis in 
the future through a pluralist attitude of the present moment. In the following 
pages, however, Rilke points to the possibility that we might be wrong about all 
our knowledge, about our interpretation of the past history, and, indeed about all 
the aspects that he has just described as extremely important. The point in this 
context, however, is that this precise insight, makes Rilke’s main character Brigge, 
realize that he cannot wait, and that he has to write heroically night and day, from 
this moment on. Scepticism does not impede action; rather it forms the basis for 
imagining a future of revelation. It is extremely productive; if we cannot know 
anything for sure we have to start writing right now. 
The postplural attitude is out of sympathy with Rilkean and Kantian ideas 
of the heroic moment and negatively defined projected visions of the future; it is 
‘post’ in that it comes after the sentiment that the here and now is a heroic or 
extraordinary moment; it is based on an irreversible explication of pluralism. 
There is no return to pluralism, and the future seems almost completely 
unknowable. In contrast to Rilke’s account, it seems somewhat absurd to go on 
with the pluralistic heritage. In relation to Kant, it seems that no exit can be found. 
‘Post’ does not refer to epochal change. Rather, post implies a problematic 
dependence on what has gone before, that is, even if they seem absurd, modern 
ideas. In an exemplary manner, Loe captures this condition. In L he describes his 
 C. Gad. A Postplural Attitude 
75 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
own situation, minimalistically, and with irony: “Here I am, 29 years old. In 
Norway. The birthplace of giants. I am at my prime. I am big and strong. I am in 
good shape. And I ask myself; what have I built? What have I, Erlend, 29 years 
old, in Norway, really built?” (1999, my translation). Loe concludes that he has 
built a wall and a bicycle. His discussion revolves around how people at his age in 
the contemporary West, currently do not have the sense of having built society or 
discovered anything important. Building nothing, they merely keep reproducing 
inherited cultural practices, but with a certain ironical insight; that there is no 
higher purpose: “Bach composed his music in honour of God. If we compose 
music it is in order to get laid. Or something similar. We, who did not build 
Norway. This is us.” (1999, my translation). 
Adopting a postplural attitude, thus, also means taking seriously the 
possible absurdity of continuing inherited practices. It does not immediately 
make sense, as it did for Rilke, to experience, forget, wait, and remember in 
order to develop a more insightful ‘perspective’, or, as it did for Kant, to wait 
for enlightenment. For Loe, there is absolutely nothing heroical or eternal about 
the present moment. 
Yet, as I have tried to describe with reference to the works of Mol and 
Sherman, the sense of being ‘post’ and without purpose, might also encourage a 
somewhat more positive attitude. It would be an attitude inclined to empirical 
philosophical experiments with different conceptions of subjectivity and ontology. 
To both Mol and Sherman, that no “greater good” or final meta-perspective exists 
is simply not that problematic. Instead, they encourage us to appreciate the 
mundane and boring aspects of ordinary practices and performances of self and 
reality. It is, after all, in such practices that lives take form, and it still seems 
worthwhile to try to understand how and why.21 
Conclusion: postplural nostalgia 
As noted, Strathern’s diagnosis of perspectivism and pluralism contains a certain 
nostalgia for modern pluralism. In Ignorance, Czech novelist M. Kundera writes 
that the word ‘nostalgia’ has its etymological roots in ‘nostos’ and ‘algos’, 
‘nostos’ meaning ‘home’ and ‘algos’ meaning suffering. Thus, nostalgia refers 
to the suffering of the person who cannot return home: it refers to a certain 
                                                          
21
 Of course, this is not a completely new idea. See, for instance, Montaigne’s proclamation: [in 
relation to understanding oneself] “no theme is too insignificant to not deserve its place in this 
rhapsody!” (1998: 69). Furthermore, Rilke’s call for patience could also be read as a modern 
insight, which is quite parallel to a postplural attitude insofar as the idea of a heroic moment 
leading to an ‘exit’ is dropped. Kant’s idea of enlightenment simply seems too grand.  
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longing for a homecoming (Kundera 2000: 6f). Kundera’s main characters are in a 
permanent crisis of identity and they are absorbed in self-reflexivity precisely 
because of their inability to return home. 
It is quite interesting that the Norwegian philosopher A. Næss has 
characterized this “longing to return” as an important characteristic of present 
(Heideggerian) philosophy (1991: 303f). Secularisation and the widespread 
rejection of universalism of any kind has produced a certain void because the 
ability to regard things as wholes and articulate a foundation has vanished. In 
this situation, philosophy itself no longer has a home, and this produces a 
longing for a past where philosophy once belonged. Similarly, the nostalgia 
inherent in Strathern’s post-plural diagnosis is an impossible longing for a 
moment when pluralism and perspectivism were unproblematic, unexplicated. 
At the start of this paper, I quoted Foucault stating that an attitude, among other 
things, refers to a task and a specific mode of belonging. The postplural attitude 
might be apprehended as a mode of belonging to a moment of non-belonging. 
On the other hand, it is precisely this nostalgia, this belonging to non-
belonging, that forces an experimental rethinking of subjectivity and ontology. 
Here, as examples of such rethinking, I have used Mol’s post-ANT-ontology, 
which develops a conception of reality as performed and multiple, and Cindy 
Sherman’s work, which elicits subjectivity as performed and multiple. Ontology 
and subjectivity are important modern ‘topoi’ that are nevertheless possible to 
displace. A postplural attitude is a matter of underlining that these topoi are not 
constantly or universally given, but dynamic, multiple and performed. One 
cannot escape the historical roots of the modern attitude, hence, it can never be 
rejected radically. A postplural attitude is, however, developed in experiments 
that aim to displace the given, including the perspective of perspectives. 
If one does not consider the modern and postmodern as epochal 
references but as attitudes, and if one considers modern universalism and 
pluralism as still active in the present moment, then the nostalgia immanent in 
Strathern’s diagnosis, can itself diagnose a particular way of relating to this 
pivotal moment. Nostalgia is thus not only a historical relation to a lost past; it is 
also a driving force in rethinking self and reality in the present. Yet, this 
rethinking requires the simultaneous relinquishing of two dreams: that of 
developing a total overview (theoria or metaperspective), and its converse, the 
possibility of achieving insight through continuous discovery of what lies 
beneath ‘surfaces’. Rather, the task set by a postplural attitude is to relate to a 
flat plane of hybridity, multiplicity, and partialness in both subjects, ontologies 
and their interrelations. 
 C. Gad. A Postplural Attitude 
77 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
References 
Barnes, B. 1983. ‘On the Conventional Character of Knowledge and Cognition’, 
in Knoor-Cetina & Mulkay (eds.): Science Observed, Perspectives on 
the Social Studies of Science, London: Sage Publications, 19–51. 
Bauman, Z. 1992. Thinking Sociologically, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Bijker, W. & T. Pinch 1989. ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or 
How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology 
Might Benefit Each Other’, in Bijker et al (eds.): The Social 
Constructions of Technological Systems – New Directions in the 
Sociology and History of Technology, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 
17–50. 
Black, M. 1962. Models and metaphors: Studies in language and philosophy, 
Oxford: Cornell University Press. 
Bowker, G. & S. L. Star 1999. Sorting Things Out: Classifications and Its 
Consequences, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. 
Butler, J. 1999. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, 
London: Routledge. 
Conrad, J. 1998 [1899]. The Heart of Darkness (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth 
Editions Ltd). 
Cambridge Dictionaries Online 2011. http://dictionary.cambridge.org/, Accessed 
July 2005. 
Darwin, C. 1975 [1859]. On the origin of species, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Descartes, R. 1960. Meditations on first philosophy, New York: Liberal Arts Press. 
Deleuze, G. & F. Guattari 1994. What is Philosophy?, New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Everything2 2011. http://everything2.com/title/Tertium+non+datur Accessed July 
2005. 
Fish, S. 2004. 'Theory’s Hope', Critical Inquiry 30: 2, 374–78. 
Foucault, M. 1992. What is Enlightenment? (Was ist Aufklärung?): 
http://eserver.org/philosophy/foucault/what-is-enlightenment.html. 
Accessed July 2005. 
Gad, C. & C. B. Jensen 2010. ‘On the Consequences of Post-ANT’, Science 
Technology & Human Values 35: 1, 55–80. 
Hacking, I. 1999. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Haraway, D. 1991a. ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ in Simians, Cyborgs and Women – The 
reinvention of nature, New York: Routledge, 21–69. 
——— 1994. ‘A Game of Cats Cradle: Science Studies, Feminist Theory, 
Cultural Studies’, Configurations 2: 1, 59–71. 
——— 1997. Modest_Witness@Second_Milenium.Femaleman©_Meets_OncoMouse™ , 
New York: Routledge. 
 C. Gad. A Postplural Attitude 
78 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
Ibsen, H. 1975 [1867]. Peer Gynt: et dramatisk Digt, Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Kant, I. 1993 [1783]. ‘What is Enlightenment’ (Danish: ‘Besvarelse af 
spørgsmålet: Hvad er oplysning?’), in Oplysning, historie, fremskridt, 
Aarhus, DK: Slagmark, 71–80. 
Klages, M. 1997. ‘Judith Butler: Gender Trouble’: 
  http://www.colorado.edu/English/ENGL2012Klages/butler.html 
Accessed July 2005. 
Kundera, M. 2002. Ignorance (Danish: Uvidenheden), Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Latour, B. 1987. Science in Action: how to follow scientist and engineers through 
society, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Loe, E. 1996. Naiv.Super, Oslo: Cappelen. 
——— 1999. «L», Oslo: Cappelen. 
Lübcke, P. (eds.) 1998. Politikkens filosofileksikon, Copenhagen: Politikkens forlag. 
Løvlie, L. 1992. ‘Postmodernism and Subjectivity’, in S. Kvale (eds.): Psychology 
and Postmodernism, London: Sage Publications, 119–34. 
Mol, A. 1999. ‘Ontological Politics. A Word on Some Questions’, in Law & 
Hassard (eds.): Actor Network Theory and after, Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers: 74–89. 
——— 2002. The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice, Durham & 
London: Duke University Press. 
——— 2011. 'One, Two, three: Cutting, Counting and Eating', Common 
Knowledge 17: 1, 111–16. 
Montaigne, M. de 1998 [1580]. Essays, first book (Danish: Essays – første bog), 
Copenhagen: Gyldendal. 
Morgan, G. 1986. Images of Organization (London: Sage Publications). 
Næss, A. 1991. The history of philosophy 2 – from Hegel to Sartre (Danish: 
Filosofiens historie 2 – Fra Hegel til Sartre), Copenhagen: Hans 
Reitzels Forlag. 
Pickering, A. 1995. The Mangle of Practice – Time, Agency & Science, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Rilke, R. M. 1986 [1910]. The Notebooks of Malte Laurids Brigge (Danish: Malte 
Laurids Brigges optegnelser), Viborg, DK: Gyldendal. 
Rose, N. 1998. Inventing Our Selves — Psychology, Power and Personhood, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
Smith, A. M. (unpublished) The Abject Female Body the Photography of Cindy 
Sherman: http://english.cla.umn.edu/alumni/asmith/sherm1.htm. 
Accessed July 2005. 
Smith, B. H. 2002. 'Cutting-Edge Equivocation: Conceptual Moves and Rhetorical 
Strategies in Contemporary Anti-Epistemology', South Atlantic Quarterly 
101: 1, 187–212. 
 C. Gad. A Postplural Attitude 
79 
NatureCulture 2013 
Copyright owned by the authors 
Strathern, M. 1991. Partial Connections, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc. 
——— 1992a. After Nature: English Kinship in the late Twentieth Century, New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 
——— 1992b. Reproducing the Future: Essays on Anthropology, Kinship, and 
the New Reproductive Technologies, London: Routledge. 
——— 1995. ‘Displacing Knowledge: Technology and the Consequences for 
Kinship’, in Ginsberg & Rapp (eds.) Conceiving the New World 
Order: The Global Politics of Reproduction, Berkeley: UC Press, 
346–64. 
——— 1999. Property, Substance and Effect: Anthropological Essays on Persons 
and Things, London & New Brunswick: Athlon Press. 
——— 2002. 'Of Space and Depth', in J. Law & A. Mol (eds), Complexities: 
Social Studies of Knowledge Practices, Durham & London: Duke 
University Press, 88–116. 
——— 2011a. 'Binary Licence', Common Knowledge 17: 1, 87–103. 
——— 2011b. 'What Politics?', Common Knowledge 17: 1, 123–27. 
The Sage Colleges 2011. http://www.sage.edu/faculty/salomd/nyssa/theoria.html. 
Accessed July 2005 
Taylor, C. 1989. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity, 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Viveiros de Castro, E. 1998. 'Cosmological Deixis and Amerindian Perspectivism', 
The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 4: 3, 469–88. 
